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THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION: THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
LIMITS THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTEXT
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (Act)'
is to assure employees safe and healthful conditions in the workplace. 2 One
method of enforcing the safety standards set forth in the Act is through
workplace inspections conducted by Compliance Safety and Health Officers
of the Department of Labor. 3 Compliance officers, like other law enforce-
ment officers, are constrained in the scope and mode of their searches by the
dictates of the fourth amendment.
4
One such fourth amendment constraint was announced in Marshall v.
Barlow's, Inc. ,5 where the United States Supreme Court held that the fourth
amendment implicitly requires officers of the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) to obtain search warrants prior to a non-
consensual inspection of an employer's place of business.6 Evidence seized in
violation of this fourth amendment constraint is generally suppressed pursu-
ant to the exclusionary rule.
7
1. Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982)). For
the legislative history set generally S. REP. No. 1292, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5177-5202.
2. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1982) (stated purpose of the Act is to "preserve the country's
human resources"); see also Cape & Vineyard Div. of New Bedford Gas v. OSHRC, 512 F.2d
1148 (1st Cir. 1975).
3. See 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1982). This section reads in pertinent part that "the Secretary
[of Labor], upon presenting appropriate credentials . . . is authorized-(l) to enter without
delay and at reasonable times any . . . workplace . . . and (2) to inspect and investigate ...
and to question privately .. " Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) held this sec-
tion unconstitutional insofar as it purports to authorize inspection of business premises without
a warrant or its equivalent. See also 29 C.F.R. § 1903.3 (1982).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. For the text of the fourth amendment, see in/fa note 11. See
also West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Donovan, 689 F.2d 950, 957-58 (11 th Cir. 1982).
5. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
6. Id at 324-25.
7. Perhaps the most succinct definition of the exclusionary rule is found in Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961), where the Court, in extending the exclusionary rule to the states held "that
all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same
authority, inadmissible in a state court." Id. at 655.
On July 5, 1984, the United States Supreme Court announced three decisions that will
have a profound effect on the exclusionary rule. In United States v. Leon, 52 U.S.L.W. 5155,
rev'g 701 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1983), the Court held that the exclusionary rule should not be
applied to bar the use of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search
warrant issued by a neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be invalid. In Massachusetts v.
Sheppard, 52 U.S.L.W. 5177, rtv'g and remanding 387 Mass. 488, 441 N.E.2d 725 (1982), the
Court held that the exclusionary rule should not apply where the searching officer acts in objec-
tively reasonable reliance on a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate that is subsequently
found to be invalid because of a technical mistake. In Immigration and Naturalization Service
v. Lopez-Mendoza, 52 U.S.L.W. 5190 (U.S. July 5, 1984), rev;g 705 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1983),
the Court held that a deportation proceeding is a purely civil action in which the exclusionary
rule does not apply.
There are several other situations in which illegally seized evidence will not be suppressed.
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The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, however, recently reassessed the
imposition of the exclusionary rule in cases where evidence is seized pursuant
to an invalid warrant. In Donovan v. Federal Clearing Die Casting Co. ,8 the Sev-
enth Circuit held that evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant, subse-
quently found to be invalid, is admissible under the goodfath exception if the
administrative officer acted reasonably and in good faith in conducting the
inspection.
9
In light of the Seventh Circuit's newly created limitation on the scope of
the exclusionary rule, this comment analyzes the Federal decision first, by
briefly outlining the case's relevant legal background; second, by presenting
the material facts of the case; third, by synthesizing the reasoning in both
majority and dissenting opinions; and finally, by exploring the logic of the
decision from constitutional, precedential, and policy perspectives.' °
I. BACKGROUND
A. Constitutional Requirements
The fourth amendment protects an individual's privacy expectation
against unlawful government intrusion by requiring that searches be both
reasonable and based upon probable cause. I  Aside from certain excep-
tional situations,' 2 the search warrant is the mechanism intended to assure
that these requirements are met.' 3 Moreover, fourth amendment protec-
tions govern searches not only of individuals but also of commercial
enterprises. 14
In 1925, the Supreme Court indicated that probable cause to conduct a
See, e.g., United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980) (permitting the use of illegally seized
evidence to impeach defendant's testimony); United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978)
(permitting use of illegally seized evidence when initial illegality has become attenuated);
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (illegally seized evidence excluded from state crimi-
nal proceeding not excluded from federal civil proceeding); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338 (1974) (illegally seized evidence not excluded at federal grand jury proceedings).
8. 695 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1982).
9. Id. at 1023.
10. A meaningful discussion of the good faith exception to the exclusion of evidence ob-
tained in an administrative search is possible only in light of the rule's criminal law background;
therefore, this comment will also address the background of the exclusionary rule in the crimi-
nal context.
11. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
12. See znTfa note 18.
13. The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that nonconsensual warrantless
searches are presumptively invalid. See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29
(1967); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
14. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967). In See the Court stated:
[T]he businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional right to go
about his business free from unreasonable official entries upon his private commercial
property. The businessman, too, has that right placed in jeopardy if the decision to
enter and inspect for violation of regulatory laws can be made and enforced by the
inspector in the field without official authority evidenced by a warrant.
Id at 543.
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search exists if the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge
would be sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that
the alleged illegal action is occurring in the place he intends to search.'
5
More than fifty years later, the Barlow's court addressed the issue of probable
cause in the administrative context by stating that it may consist of either
showing that the inspection was conducted pursuant to current administra-
tive standards or that there existed specific evidence of the alleged viola-
tion.' 6 The Barlow's court also stated that probable cause in the criminal
law context is not required for an OSHA inspection, instead a standard less
stringent than the criminal standard would suffice.17
Apart from the limited exceptional classes of cases,' a warrantless
search has been considered inherently unreasonable.' 9  In determining
whether a warrant is a necessary safeguard for the protection of constitu-
tional rights in the administrative search context, the Supreme Court has
weighed the public's interest in effective law enforcement against the indi-
vidual's privacy interest.2 0 Hence, given the lesser standard of probable
cause, and the magistrate's freedom to apply this balancing of interests, the
Supreme Court arguably grants the individual less protection under the
fourth amendment in the administrative search context than in the criminal
context.
15. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925). A search of an automobile for
liquor, subject to seizure under the Prohibition Act, does not violate the fourth amendment if
made upon probable cause; that is, "upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances
known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is
subject to seizure and destruction. ... Id. at 149.
16. 436 U.S. at 320-21. For a more detailed discussion of probable cause see Ball, Good
Faith and the Fourth Amendment. The "Reasonable" Exception to the Exclusionay Rule, 69 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 635 (1978).
17. The Barlow's Court explained the applicable standard of probable cause as follows:
Probable cause in the criminal law sense is not required. For purposes of an adminis-
trative search such as this, probable cause justifying the issuance of a warrant may be
based not only on specific evidence of an existing violation but also on a showing that
"reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an . . . inspection
are satisfied with respect to a particular [establishment]." Camara o. Municipal Court,
387 U.S., at 538. A warrant showing that a specific business has been chosen for an
OSHA search on the basis of a general administrative plan for the enforcement of the
Act derived from neutral sources such as, for example, dispersion of employees in vari-
ous types of industries across a given area, and the desired frequency of searches in any
of the lesser divisions of the area, would protect an employer's Fourth Amendment
rights.
436 U.S. at 320-321 (footnote omitted).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (permitting warrantless searches
of gun dealerships). Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (permitting
warrantless searches of liquor dealerships). Pollard v. Cockrell, 578 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1978)
(permitting warrantless searches of massage parlors for building code violations).
19. Barlow'r, 436 U.S. at 312.
20. See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 541 (1967). In Camara the Court
stated:
In assessing whether the public interest demands creation of a general exception to the
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, the question is not whether the public
interest justifies the type of search in question, but whether the authority to search
should be evidenced by a warrant, which in turn depends in part upon whether the
burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind
the search.
Id at 534. See also See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
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B. The Exclusionary Rule and Its Rationale
The exclusionary rule, or suppression doctrine, is a judicially created
remedy designed to safeguard constitutional rights by suppressing evidence
obtained in violation of the reasonableness and probable cause requirements
of the fourth amendment. 2 ' This rule was first applied in 1914 to illegal
searches conducted by federal officials in Weeks v. United States2 2 and was
applied to the states in 1961 by Mapp v. Ohio.
23
The exclusionary rule has been historically based on one of three ratio-
nales: to advance a personal constitutional right,24 to preserve judicial integ-
rity,2 5 and most important, to deter official misconduct. 26 Recently,
however, both the personal constitutional right theory and the judicial integ-
rity arguments have failed to persuade the Court to suppress evidence. 27 In
United States v. Calandra28 the Court elevated deterrence to prime importance
and refused to accept the dissent's assertion that the exclusionary rule in-
heres in the fourth amendment's limitation on unlawful searches and
seizures and is founded upon the imperative of judicial integrity.2 9 The Ca-
landra decision laid the foundation for the current judicial trend of narrow-
ing the scope of situations in which the exclusionary rule applies.
30
Two years after Calandra, the Court in United States v. Janis3t refused to
apply the exclusionary rule in a federal civil tax proceeding where the evi-
dence had been illegally seized by a criminal law enforcement agent of a
state government. 32 In the majority opinion, Justice Blackmun embarked
21. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974).
22. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The exclusionary rule was first recognized by way of dictum in
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 638 (1886).
23. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
24. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398.
25. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 469-485 (1928) (Holmes and Brandeis J.J., dissenting), overruled on other grounds, Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). See also Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 387 Mass. 488,
500-03, 441 N.E.2d 725, 737-43 (1982) (Liacos, J., concurring), rev'd, 52 U.S.L.W. 5177 (U.S.
July 5, 1984).
26. In Calandra, Justice Powell observed:
The rule's primary purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby
effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and
seizures: "The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter-to
compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-
by removing the incentive to disregard it." Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217
(1960).
414 U.S. at 347. See also Donovan v. Sarasota Concrete Co., 693 F.2d 1061 (11 th Cir. 1982).
. 27. See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 458 n.35 (1976) (considerations ofjudicial
integrity are subordinate to deterrence and do not require exclusion of the evidence). See also S.
REP. No. 350, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. 3 n.21 (1983), where the Senate Judiciary Committee ex-
pressly rejected the proposition that the exclusionary rule is required by the Constitution.
28. 414 U.S 338 (1974) (exclusionary rule does not extend to grand jury proceedings).
29. Id at 355 (Brennan, J., dissenting). It is the view of Justice Brennan that the exclusion-
ary rule enables "the judiciary to avoid the taint of partnership in official lawlessness" and
assures the people "that the government would not profit from the lawless behavior, thus mini-
mizing the risk of seriously undermining popular trust in government." Id at 357.
30. See supra note 7.
31. 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
32. Id at 454. In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza, 52
U.S.L.W. 5190 (U.S. July 5, 1984), the Court held that a deportation proceeding is a purely
civil action in which the exclusionary rule does not apply. If the exclusionary rule does not
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upon an exhaustive discussion of the empirical inconclusiveness surrounding
the exclusionary rule's impact on deterrence of unconstitutional police con-
duct. 33 Justice Blackmun concluded that exclusion in a federal civil pro-
ceeding would be unlikely to deter unlawful but good faith conduct of state
police. 34 TheJanis holding, however, stopped short of concluding that de-
terrence of official abuse will never be advanced by excluding evidence ob-
tained pursuant to a search warrant executed in good faith but subsequently
found to be invalid.
C. The Quasi-Criminal Distinctibn
In addition to constitutional considerations, judicial integrity, and de-
terrence, courts have also considered whether evidence obtained from an ille-
gal search will give rise to a "quasi-criminal" penalty as opposed to a civil
penalty in a non-criminal case. 35 Although OSHA rarely has cause to im-
pose criminal penalties, 36 the quasi-criminal penalties it does impose can be
severe, as exemplified by the $34,000 in penalties imposed in Federal. Gener-
ally, courts seem more willing to apply the exclusionary rule in situations
where the threatened penalty is "quasi-criminal" instead of civil. 37 Appar-
ently, this distinction is made because "quasi-criminal" penalties may in-
volve punishment which is comparable to or greater than some criminal
penalties.
38
The penalties which may be levied against an employer for violating
OSHA requirements are found within the Act itself.39 The plain language
of the Act distinguishes only between civil and criminal penalties40 and
apply to deportation proceedings because they are civil actions, it should not, consequently,
apply in OSHA proceedings which are no less civil, nor more criminal, in nature than deporta-
tion proceedings.
33. Id. at 447-60.
34. d. at 454.
35. See, e.g., Savina Home Industries v. Secretary of Labor, 594 F.2d 1358, 1362 n.6 (10th
Cir. 1979). The term "quasi-criminal" has been defined as relating to civil laws which, in gen-
eral, "provide for civil money penalties, forfeitures of property," and the levying of punitive
"disabilities such as the loss of a professional license or public employment." Clark, Civil and
Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures.- A Framework for Constitutional Anayszs, 60 MINN. L. REV. 379, 381
(1976). See also One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700 (1965); Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886). "[S]uits for penalties and forfeitures incurred by the
commission of offences [sic] against the law, are of this quasi-criminal nature, we think that they
are within the reason of criminal proceedings for all the purposes of the Fourth Amendment of
the Constitution ....
36. The criminal penalty provided for under the Act states that:
Any employer who willfully violates any standard, rule, or order promulgated
pursuant to section 655 of this title, or of any regulations prescribed pursuant to this
chapter, and that violation caused death to any employee, shall, upon conviction, be
punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 or by imprisonment for not more than six
months, or by both; except that if the conviction is for a violation committed after a
first conviction of such person, punishment shall be by a fine of not more than $20,000
or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by both.
29 U.S.C. § 666(e) (1982).
37. See, e.g., One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, 380 U.S. at 700-702; Savina Home Industries, 594
F.2d at 1362.
38. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, 380 U.S. at 701.
39. 29 U.S.C. § 666(a)-(e) (1982).
40. 29 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1982) (willful or repeated violations may be assessed a civil penalty
of not more than $10,000 for each violation). 29 U.S.C. § 666(e) (1982) (violations causing
DENVER LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:3
makes no reference to "quasi-criminal penalties." Various commentators
and judges, however, have concluded that "penalties having both certain
penal and civil aspects appear on balance to be 'quasi-criminal'.
4 1
D. The Good Faith Exception
The Federal decision assumes major administrative and constitutional
significance because it represents the first time a court has directly applied a
good faith exception to the exclusion of evidence in an administrative law
context.42 The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, if applied at
all, may apply only when an officer acts in the good faith belief that his
conduct is constitutional and where he has a reasonable basis for that be-
lief.43 Under the good faith exception, if a judge finds that the officer rea-
sonably conducted a search in good faith, the exception to the exclusionary
rule is invoked and the fruits of the invalid search are admissible.
44
The good faith exception was not adopted by an appellate court until
1980 when the Fifth Circuit announced the new rule in United States v. Wi-
hams.45 The Williams case, however, did not involve an administrative
search; rather, it involved heroin seized in a search made incidental to a
criminal arrest.
46
Judges Gee and Vance, in part two of the 'litims opinion, stated that
the evidence seized was valid regardless of whether the defendant's arrest
was technically correct. 47 The court found that "evidence is not to be sup-
pressed under the exclusionary rule where it is discovered by officers in the
course of actions that are taken in good faith and in the reasonable, though
mistaken, belief that they are authorized.
'48
death may be punishable by a fine of up to $10,000 or by imprisonment of not more than six
months).
41. Trant, OSHA and the Exclusionary Rule.- Should the Employer Go Free Because the Compliance
Officer has Blundered?, 1981 DUKE L.J. 667. See also Savina Home Industries, 594 F.2d at 1362 n.6
(10th Cir. 1979).
42. The exception was first recognized by way of dicta in Robberson Steel Co. v. OSHRC, 645
F.2d 22 (10th Cir. 1980).
43. See supra note 7. See generally Ball, supra note 16, at 635.
44. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary has recently issued a report on Senate Bill
1764, the Exclusionary Rule Limitation Act of 1983, which proposes to enact a good faith ex-
ception to the exclusionary rule at section 3505 of title 18, United States Code. The new section
would read:
Except as specifically provided by statute, evidence which is obtained as a result
of a search or seizure and which is otherwise admissible shall not be excluded in a
proceeding in a court of the United States if the search or seizure was undertaken in a
reasonable, good faith belief that it was in conformity with the fourth amendment to
the Constitution of the United States. A showing that evidence was obtained pursuant
to and within the scope of a warrant constitutes prima facie evidence of such a reason-
able good faith belief, unless the warrant was obtained through intentional and mate-
rial misrepresentation.
S. REP. No. 350, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. 1-2 (1983).
45. 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (alternative holding), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127
(1980).
46. Id. at 833.
47. Id at 840.
48. Id In a footnote, the judges elaborated upon the prerequisites for the invocation of the
exception and stated:
We emphasize that the belief, in addition to being held in subjective good faith,
must be grounded in an objective reasonableness. It must therefore be based upon
GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION
The Williams court based its decision on the deterrence rationale stating
that the exclusionary rule exists to deter flagrant abuses of police search
power and not reasonable good-faith ones.4 9 The majority expounded upon
the 1975 Supreme Court case of Brown v. Illinois50 where Justice Powell, in a
concurring opinion, distinguished between flagrant police abuses of the
fourth amendment and mere "technical violations." 5 1 Justice Powell con-
ceded that the fruits of an abusive or flagrant fourth amendment violation
must be surrendered to demands of judicial integrity and deterrence; how-
ever, where mere technical violations exist, neither of these considerations
justify the exclusion of reliable and probative evidence. 52 Setting forth ex-
amples of technical violations, the Williams court specifically included the
situation where an agent relies on a warrant, issued by a neutral magistrate,
which is later invalidated. 53 Two other examples of technical violations
cited by the Wiiams court include reliance on a statute which is later ruled
unconstitutional, 54 and reliance on a court precedent which is later
overruled.
55
E. The Current Confusion
Only a handful of circuits have addressed the issue of the applicability
of the exclusionary rule in administrative searches, and among those that
recognize the applicability, even fewer have extended their analysis to in-
clude the good faith exception. In 1978, for example, the Ninth Circuit
suggested that the exclusionary rule does not apply to OSHA proceedings.
5 6
The court rejected the idea that the exclusion of evidence is a personal con-
stitutional right, stating that under the particular facts of the case, the exclu-
sionary rule did not apply.
57
In contrast to the Ninth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit in Savina Home Indus-
tries v. Secreta of Labor 58 suggested that the exclusionary rule could apply to
OSHA inspections violative of the warrant requirements announced in Bar-
articulable premises sufficient to cause a reasonable, and reasonably trained, officer to
believe that he was acting lawfully. Thus, a series of broadcast breakins and searches
carried out by a constable-no matter how pure in heart-who had never heard of the
fourth amendment could never qualify.
Id at 841 n.4a.
49. Id at 840.
50. 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
51. Id at 611-12 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
52. Id
53. See Wilzams, 622 F.2d at 841.
54. See, e.g., Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
55. Wiliazms, 622 F.2d at 841.
56. Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 586 F.2d 683, 689 (9th Cir. 1978). The
court stated: "that the Supreme Court has never applied the exclusionary rule in a civil pro-
ceeding suggests that the rule should not be applied to OSHA proceedings." Id (citing United
States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976); see aLro supra note 32.
57. The Ninth Circuit specifically held that retroactive application of the exclusionary rule
would have no deterrent effect on future unlawful police conduct and therefore imposition of
the rule would be purposeless. Todd, 586 F.2d at 690. The court specifically stated, however,
that it did not decide whether the exclusionary rule would apply "to an OSHA search in a
proper case." Id at 691.
58. 594 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1979).
1984]
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low's. 59 The Savina court reasoned that, in the absence of an exclusionary
sanction, a conclusion that an inspection violated the fourth amendment
would be of no practical significance. 60 In accord with the Savina dictum is a
1982 Second Circuit opinion which stated that "the exclusionary rule can be
properly and beneficially applied in those civil proceedings where it has a
realistic prospect of achieving marginal deterrence."
6 1
Adding to this discordance is the inconsistency among the circuits on
the issue of whether a good faith exception applies to evidence seized ille-
gally during an OSHA inspection. The Tenth Circuit was the first to recog-
nize the exception, as originally stated by Williams62 in the criminal context,
as being applicable to the administrative context. In Robberson Steel Co. v.
OSHRC
6 3 the court stated in dictum, that the good faith exception is equally
applicable in civil OSHA enforcement cases. 64
Shortly after Robberson, the Eleventh Circuit, in Donovan v. Sarasota Con-
crete Co. ,65 analyzed an Occupational Safety and Health Review Commis-
sion (OSHRC) decision which rejected the possibility of applying the good
faith exception. 66 The court concluded that the Commission properly re-
jected the application of the exclusionary rule.6 7 The court rejected the
good faith argument, at least as applied to the Sarasota facts, by distinguish-
ing Williams on the basis that it involved a criminal rather than a civil ac-
tion, and because Wilhams involved a search made incidental to an arrest,
not a search conducted pursuant to an invalid warrant.
68
II. FACTS
Against this highly inconsistent and rapidly developing background, the
Seventh Circuit decided Donovan v. Federal Clearing Die Casting Co.. The inci-
dents which led up to the Seventh Circuit's decision began on January 7,
1980, when Natalio Alamillo had both hands severed while working on a
punch press at the Federal Clearing Die Casting Co. (Federal). 69 Two days
later, the Chicago Sun-Times printed an article describing a twenty-three hour
operation during which surgeons reattached Alamillo's hands. The article
stated that Alamillo's family members were uncertain how the injury took
place; officials at Federal refused to comment on the cause of the accident.
70
59. Id. at 1363.
60. Id. at 1361.
61. Tirado v. Commissioner, 689 F.2d 307, 314 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1256
(1983). The Tirado court rejected the civil/criminal distinction as a basis for invoking the rule
by stating: "A test for the exclusionary rule that turns on the civil or criminal character of the
proceeding does not comport with an objective of achieving substantial deterrence." Id at 313-
14.
62. 622 F.2d at 830.
63. 645 F.2d 22 (10th Cir. 1980).
64. Id at 22.
65. 693 F.2d 1061 (1 lth Cir. 1982).
66. 9 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1608 (1981), affdsub nor., Donovan v. Sarasota Concrete Co., 693
F.2d 1061 (llth Cir. 1982).
67. 693 F.2d at 1072 (1 1th Cir. 1982).
68. Id.
69. 695 F.2d at 1021.
70. Id. at 1026 (Pell, J., dissenting).
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On January 10, the Sun-T'mes printed a picture of the victim with the
doctor who headed the surgery team. The caption under the picture in-
cluded a statement from the OSHA area director that referred to past punch
press violations found at Federal and expressed OSHA's intent to make an
"unannounced" inspection of the plant. 7 1
On the same day, an OSHA compliance officer attempted a warrantless
search of the Federal premises but was refused entry. 72 Immediately thereaf-
ter the agent sought and obtained approval of a warrant application by a
United States magistrate. 73 On the following day, OSHA agents, with war-
rant in hand, again attempted a search of Federal, but were again denied
entry on the ground that the warrant had been improperly issued. 74 Federal
subsequently filed a motion to quash the warrant in the district court and
OSHA filed a civil contempt petition against Federal.
75
Both matters were decided by the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, which sustained the warrant's validity, found
Federal in civil contempt, and ordered the inspection of Federal's premises.76
Soon thereafter, Federal appealed the district court's decision to the Seventh
Circuit which, seventeen months later, dissolved the warrant and reversed
the ordered inspection, holding that the initial warrant had been issued
without probable cause.
77
During the interim, however, OSHA conducted a wall-to-wall inspec-
tion of Federal's premises pursuant to the district judge's order. The inspec-
tion revealed the existence of sixteen serious, five willful, five repeated, and
two other-than-serious violations. 78 As a result, OSHA proposed penalties of
$35,400. 79 Federal contested these citations and the case was docketed to be
heard by an administrative law judge (ALJ).
While this administrative case was pending, the earlier appeal to the
Seventh Circuit was decided on the issue of the warrant's validity. 0 In re-
sponse, Federal filed with the administrative court a motion to suppress evi-
dence, and in the alternative a motion to dismiss. The ALJ granted the
motion to suppress, thereby suppressing all evidence seized, and dismissed
the citations.8' In ruling on the motion, the ALJ relied on Secretay of Labor v.
71. Brief for the Respondent at 2, Donovan v. Federal Clearing Die Casting Co., 695 F.2d
1020 (7th Cir. 1982).
72. Federal, 695 F.2d at 1021. The Barlow's Court discounted Congress' finding that the
success of OSHA depends upon surprise inspections, thereby creating an obvious disincentive
for businessmen to consent to warrantless inspections 436 U.S. at 319-20.
73. Federal, 695 F.2d at 1021.
74. Id.
75. Brief for the Respondent at 3.
76. Id. at 4.
77. Donovan v. Federal Clearing Die Casting Co., 655 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1981).
78. Id. at 1021 n.2. For further discussion on the OSHA penalties see 29 U.S.C. § 666
(1982) (types of violations and the amount of penalties attached thereto); 29 C.F.R. 1903.14
(1983) (issuance of citations by the Area Director and de minimus violations). See also Califor-
nia Stevedore & Ballast Co. v. OSHRC, 517 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam).
79. 695 F.2d at 1021 n.2. See 29 C.F.R. § 1903.15 (1983) (explanation of procedure regard-
ing proposal of penalties).
80. Donovan v. Federal Clearing Die Casting Co., 655 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1981).
81. Brief for the Respondent at 4.
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Sarasota Concrete Co. 82 which held that an ex-employee's complaint to OSHA
of a specific hazard did not establish sufficient probable cause for the issu-
ance of an inspection warrant applicable to the entire workplace; and, there-
fore, evidence seized pursuant to such a warrant should be suppressed.
83
The Secretary of Labor petitioned for administrative review of the ALJ's
decision but was rejected and the decision thereby became final in the ad-
ministrative process.
8 4
The Secretary then appealed directly to the Seventh Circuit.8 5 The
appeal relied upon United States v. Williams.86 The Secretary principally ar-
gued that the ALJ's decision should be reversed because "the Secretary rea-
sonably and in good faith believed the invalid warrant under which he
conducted his inspection was proper."'8 7 In response, Federal argued that
the good faith exception announced in Williams did not apply in OSHA
proceedings.8
The Seventh Circuit89 reversed the ALJ and invoked for the first time,
in an administrative law context, the good faith exception to the exclusion-
ary rule. The court held that evidence shall not be suppressed under the
exclusionary rule when it is discovered in the course of actions taken in good
faith and in the reasonable, though mistaken, belief that the actions are
authorized.90
III. REASONING
A. The Majority Opinion
Chief Judge Cummings' majority opinion held that the evidence ob-
tained pursuant to a warrant upheld by the district court and provisionally
upheld by the court of appeals, but invalidated more than one year later,
was admissible under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.91
The opinion was primarily premised on the idea that an inspection made
pursuant to a district judge's orders amounts to a reasonable and good faith
inspection.
92
From this starting point, 93 the majority relied primarily on two cases to
arrive at its conclusion. First, the court cited Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Secretay of
Labor94 as authority for the proposition that the exclusionary rule should not
82. 9 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1608.
83. Id.
84. 695 F.2d at 1021 nl. See 29 U.S.C. § 661(i) (1982).
85. 695 F.2d at 1021. See 29 U.S.C. § 660(b) (1982).
86. 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980).
87. Brief for the Petitioner at 6.
88. Brief for the Respondent at 36-38.
89. Chief Judge Cummings wrote the opinion of the court in which Senior District Judge
Dumbauld joined.
90. 695 F.2d at 1023.
91. Id
92. Id at 1025.
93. The majority first rejected Federal's preliminary arguments of res judicata and failure
to exhaust administrative remedies. 695 F.2d at 1022.
94. 586 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1978).
[Vol. 61:3
GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION
be applied to OSHA proceedings.95 Second, the court cited United States V.
Williams96 for the proposition that a good faith exception already exists in
the criminal law arena.97 The court quoted at length from the Williams
opinion; the most relevant part stated:
[T]he exclusionary rule exists to deter willful or flagrant actions by
police, not reasonable, good-faith ones. Where the reason for the
rule ceases, its application must cease also. The costs to society of
applying the rule beyond the purposes it exists to serve are simply
too high ... .9
In further support of its position, the majority cited dicta from the three
paragraph opinion in Robberson Steel Co. v. OSHRC where the Tenth Circuit
noted that the Williams reasoning applies to civil OSHA enforcement pro-
ceedings.99 Furthermore, the court reasoned that an application of the ex-
clusionary rule would preclude both the issuance of an order to abate the
hazardous working conditions and the possibility of assessing subsequent en-
hanced penalties'0° for non-compliance with the Act. 1 1
The court also reasoned that if the exclusionary rule were applied,
OSHA might not be able to obtain a subsequent warrant because "the origi-
nal probable cause might be too stale or non-existent." 10 2 Moreover, the
additional delay resulting from an application of the exclusionary rule could
allow Federal to alter or disguise the violations, thus thwarting the purpose
of the Act.1
0 3
The majority also noted that there are already alternatives to the exclu-
sionary rule that serve to deter OSHA violations of an employer's constitu-
tional rights. These include: the requirement to secure the approval of a
neutral magistrate before OSHA may inspect premises over an employer's
objections; the employer's right to move to quash a warrant prior to its exe-
cution; and, the ability of an employer to refuse entry pursuant to a warrant
unless the Secretary prevails in a civil contempt proceeding.'
0 4
Finally, the majority rejected as irrelevant the deterrence argument and
stated that "good-faith, reasonably based violation[s] of this type cannot be
deterred."' 1 5 The majority summed up by stating that the judicially ap-
proved inspection warrant, coupled with the delay before its execution,
"demonstrates the Secretary's good faith, the reasonableness of his belief that
the warrant was proper, and his caution before executing the warrant.'
10 6
95. Federal, 695 F.2d at 1024.
96. 622 F.2d 830.
97. 695 F.2d at 1023.
98. Id at 1023 (quoting Wdhams, 622 F.2d at 840).
99. Robberson, 645 F.2d 22 (10th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
100. See 29 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1982).
101. Federal, 695 F.2d at 1024.
102. Id.
103. Id (citing Barlow's, 436 U.S. 307, 316 (1980)).
104. 695 F.2d at 1024.
105. Id (citing United States v. Carmichael, 489 F.2d 983, 988 (7th Cir. 1973)).
106. 695 F.2d at 1024.
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B. The Dissenting Opinion
Judge Pell's dissent represents a more detailed analysis of the applicabil-
ity of the exclusionary rule and good faith exception.' 0 7 His analysis is di-
vided into two general parts. The first part addresses the major principles
relevant to the suppression issue,10 8 and the second part rebuts specific
points raised by the majority.' 09
Judge Pell's first major assertion was that OSHA lacked the requisite
probable cause.1 10 He noted that neither of the two Sun-Times articles con-
cerning the accident made any reference to culpability on anyone's part, or
to any particular OSHA violation."' Furthermore, he attacked the ade-
quacy of the Department of Labor's Occupational Safety and Health Field
Operations Manual which provides for OSHA investigation of "accidents
involving significant publicity" as being an unreasonable administratively
created basis of probable cause. 1 2 Judge Pell argued that the only "signifi-
cant" aspect of the publicity regarded the extraordinary surgical effort and
that there was not a "whisper of a basis" for OSHA concluding that the
accident resulted from an OSHA violation."
13
Judge Pell then addressed the relationship between the OSHRC and
the non-administrative federal courts. In short, he opted for deference to the
OSHRC decisions because it has special competence in the field of occupa-
tional safety and health and because a court "must therefore defer to the
findings and analysis of the Commission unless such findings are without
substantial basis in fact.""'14
Next, the dissent asserted that the evidence seized violated both statu-
tory and constitutional restrictions." m 5 Judge Pell, in support of this conten-
tion, cited section 658(a) of the Act 1 6 for the proposition that OSHA
citations may only issue "upon inspection or investigation conducted pursu-
ant to law."' '17 He qualified the statute by quoting from the legislative his-
tory: "In carrying out inspection duties under this Act, the Secretary, of
course, would have to act in accordance with applicable constitutional pro-
tections."' " 8 According to Judge Pell, these constitutional protections in-
clude vacating any OSHA citation not preceded by a lawfully conducted
107. Id. at 1025 (Pell, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 1026-29.
109. Id. at 1029-33.
110. Judge Pell preliminarily maintained that the case was barred by res judicata, that the
Secretary of Labor did not exhaust his administrative remedies, and that it is not proper for a
court of appeals to "relegate the exclusionary rule to dodo status" when the Supreme Court has
not chosen to do so. Id. at 1025-26. In retrospect, Judge Pell might agree that such status has
since been conferred.
111. Id. at 1026-27.
112. Id. at 1027.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1028.
116. 29 U.S.C. § 658(a) (1982).
117. 695 F.2d at 1028 (Pell, J., dissenting).
118. 695 F.2d at 1028 (Pell, J., dissenting) (quoting 116 CONG. REc. 38709 (1970) (state-




Judge Pell also strongly argued for the applicability of the deterrence
rationale by stating that exclusion of illegally obtained evidence in cases
such as this will "have relatively rapid and widespread effects in ensuring
that OSHA inspections are conducted in accordance with the fourth amend-
ment." 120 The Judge then launched into a tirade composed of one-line judi-
cial admonitions of past OSHA misconduct, thereby making clear his belief
that OSHA had acted as unreasonably in the instant case as it had in the
past. ' 2 The exclusion of evidence therefore was necessary to deter such abu-
sive conduct. Furthermore, Judge Pell suggested that the compliance officer
knew, or should have known, that his actions were unreasonable.'
2 2
In further support of his contention that OSHA acted unreasonably,
Judge Pell noted that the inspection was plant-wide and not targeted exclu-
sively at the operation that caused injury to the victim. He thereby sug-
gested that an OSHA inspection, prompted by a punch press injury, should
be restricted to that particular punch press.'
2 3
The second major part of Judge Pell's dissent responded to specific case
law tendered by the majority. For example, the dissent rejected Todd12 4 as
not presenting any substantive authority for the proposition that the exclu-
sionary rule should not be applied to OSHA proceedings, because Todd dis-
cussed the inapplicability of the exclusionary rule in dictum only.'
2 5
By advocating use of the exclusionary rule in an OSHA search case,
Judge Pell implicitly chose not to recognize United States v. Jams 126 as creat-
ing a general bar to the exclusion of evidence in all proceedings which are
arguably civil in nature. Instead, Judge Pell argued that there is an "ab-
sence of clear-cut authority" from the Supreme Court that the exclusionary
rule should not be applied to OSHA proceedings.1 2 7 The judge also alluded
to the quasi-criminal nature of the OSHA penalties as a further basis for
invoking the rule.' 2 8 The Todd dicta was ultimately dismissed by Judge Pell
as a "gratuitous suggestion" which "carries little weight."'
2 9
Judge Pell then turned to the keystone of the majority opinion, United
States v. jlhams.' 30  He attacked the applicability of Wilams on two
119. 695 F.2d at 1028 (Pell, J., dissenting).
120. 695 F.2d at 1028 (citing Secretary of Labor v. Sarasota Concrete Co., 9 O.S.H. Cas.
(BNA) 1608, 1613 (1981), afd sub. nor., Donovan v. Sarasota Concrete Co., 693 F.2d 1061 (11 th
Cir. 1982)).
121. 695 F.2d at 1028-29 (Pell, J., dissenting).
122. Id at 1029.
123. Id Donovan v. Sarasota Concrete Co., 693 F.2d 1061 (11th Cir. 1982), held that
searches prompted by an employee complaint of a specific work area must be confined to that
area and evidence obtained from areas other than those specified is subject to exclusion. Id. at
1068-70. Sarasota was not decided by the circuit court until after the Federal decision.
124. Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 586 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1978).
125. The Todd court held that the Barlow's decision did not have retroactive application,
586 F.2d at 689.
126. 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
127. 695 F.2d at 1030 (Pell, J., dissenting); but cf. supra note 32.
128. Id. at 1032.
129. Id
130. 622 F.2d 830.
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grounds. First, there was no factual resemblance between the two
searches;' 3 1 one was criminal, the other civil. Second, even if the facts were
substantially similar, the instant facts failed to meet the Williams two-
pronged test of good faith and reasonableness: "Believing in good faith that
an accident has occurred is by no means a good faith belief that it was the
result of a safety violation."' 132 Consequently, Judge. Pell asserted that he
could not reasonably believe that on the basis of a "meager report of an
accident in a newspaper" an agent could objectively and reasonably believe
that a violation existed.'
33
Judge Pell then attacked the two Tenth Circuit cases relied upon by the
majority: 134 Robberson Steel Co. v. OSHRC 135 and Savina Home Industries, Inc. v.
Secretaty of Labor.136 He argued against the applicability of these cases by
pointing out that the controlling issue in both was whether Barlow's could
apply retroactively and not whether the exclusionary rule applies in non-
criminal contexts.'
37
Finally, Judge Pell rejected the argument that OSHA may be unable to
obtain another warrant because of staleness or non-existence of the original
violations. 138 He reasoned that OSHA is free to conduct future inspections
because there is no specific statutory time limit governing a subsequent
search other than that the search be conducted "as soon as practicable after
receiving a complaint."' 39 Therefore, if the hazardous condition has disap-
peared through the mere passage of time or through affirmative action,
OSHA's statutory purpose has been achieved. If, on the other hand, the
hazardous conditions have not been abated, OSHA may always conduct an-
other inspection. 40
III. ANALYSIS
The problem presented by Federal is one characteristic of most illegal
search cases; it depicts the conflict between the law enforcement agent's per-
ceived need to inspect and the owner's expectation of privacy. In order to
determine whether the Federal holding is sound, this analysis approaches the
decision from constitutional, precedential, and societal (policy) perspectives.
131. 695 F.2d at 1030 (Pell, J., dissenting).
132. Id
133. Id. at 1031.
134. Id. at 1031-32.
135. 645 F.2d 22 (10th Cir. 1980).
136. 594 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1979).
137. 695 F.2d at 1037 (Pell, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 1032-33.
139. 29 U.S.C. § 657() (1982).
140. 695 F.2d at 1037 (Pell, J., dissenting). The dissent does not adequately consider the
fact that that a man lost both of his hands, albeit temporarily, and the loss may have been
caused by the willful neglect of Federal. During the interim between accident and search,
which Judge Pell considers harmless, employers can cover up the hazard thereby avoiding any
possible penalty. Therefore, as long as an employer knows that any accident caused by a viola-
tion can be quickly covered up or corrected, there is a disincentive to comply with OSHA
standards. Hence, worker health and safety is further jeopardized and OSHA's attempt to sat-
isfy its statutory purpose is further inhibited.
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The analysis then delineates and responds to some of the major criticisms of
establishing a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
A. Constitutional, Precedential and Societal Perspectives
Prior to Federal, evidence obtained pursuant to a nonconsensual admin-
istrative search conducted without probable cause was suppressed. 1 4  Be-
cause the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals had previously determined that
objective probable cause was lacking in the search of Federal's premise;
142
the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant was obtained illegally and ought
to have been suppressed. However, because the fourth amendment does not
itself call for exclusion of evidence, it would follow that a good faith excep-
tion to a judicial remedy is not unconstitutional.
The good faith exception realistically, will apply only upon some show-
ing that the inspecting officer believed he acted constitutionally. The state
of mind of the investigating officer, therefore, is important when analyzing
the applicability of the good faith exception and, hence, the determination
of the probable cause the officer believed existed becomes more subjec-
tive.' 4 3 In Barlow's, the Supreme Court announced two possible grounds for
a finding of probable cause: specific evidence of an existing violation, or
showing that reasonable legislative or administrative standards for con-
ducting an inspection were satisfied. 144 Whereas Barlow's analyzed probable
cause from this objective perspective, Federal suggests that probable cause
exists if the officer acted reasonably in believing it existed given the attend-
ant circumstances, which include both specific facts and administrative stan-
dards. In short, Federal differs from past analyses of fourth amendment
compliance because it considers the officer's state of mind.' 45
If good faith is accepted as the controlling standard, several elements
suggest that the OSHA officer in Federal acted reasonably and possessed a
141. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
142. Donovan v. Federal Clearing Die Casting Co., 655 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1981) (decided
by a different panel of judges than the subsequent Federal decision, 695 F.2d 1020).
143. That is, the ostensibly reasonable mind of the reviewing judge must evaluate, to some
degree, the mind of the searching officer, as it existed at the time of the search, and the circum-
stances surrounding the search to determine, objectively, whether the search was reasonable.
Based on this test for reasonableness, it is understandable that one might conclude that the
creation of a good faith exception "will not dispel any confusion that now exists in Fourth
Amendment Jurisprudence." S. REP. No. 350, 98th Cong. 2d Seas. 37 (1984) (minority view of
Senator Mathias on the proposed Exclusionary Rule Limitation Act of 1983).
144. 436 U.S. at 320.
145. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary recently rejected the notion that a good faith
exception would promote police ignorance of the fourth amendment, S. REP. No. 350, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1984). In so doing, the committee quoted from Williams: "We emphasize
the belief, in addition to being held in subjective good faith, must be grounded in an objective
reasonableness. It must therefore be based upon articulable premises sufficient to cause a rea-
sonable, and reasonably trained, officer to believe that he was acting lawfully." Williams, 622
F.2d at 841 n.4a.
In the same report, however, Senator Mathias, expressing the view of the minority, asked:
"Assuming we in Congress have the power to relax the requirement of the exclusionary rule,
what message would we send to law enforcement by doing so?" S. REP. No. 350, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 38 (1984). Answering his own question, Senator Mathias stated: "Our action will invite
law enforcement at all levels to regress to the days when some police departments viewed the
Fourth Amendment as a statement of principles with no practical effect." Id.
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good faith belief that his actions were constitutional-that is, he reasonably
believed his acts were based on sufficient probable cause and were objec-
tively reasonable.
The first factor supporting the reasonableness of the officer's belief that
probable cause existed was the extremely serious character of the victim's
injury. The injury consisted of an employee having both hands cut off while
operating a punch press. 146 The fact that the victim's hands were subse-
quently reattached does not mitigate the seriousness of the injury. More im-
portant is the severe nature of the accident itself and the fact that such an
accident generally would not occur absent extreme carelessness by the victim
or a serious violation of safety standards by the employer. 14 7 In short, based
on the gruesome nature of the injury, the officer arguably acted reasonably
in believing that there was probable cause to inspect the Federal premises for
OSHA violations. It is unlikely, however, that the injury itself would consti-
tute "specific evidence of an existing violation" under the Barlow's test for
probable cause. 143
A second factor is that Federal had a history of OSHA violations in-
cluding punch press safety violations.t49 The inspecting compliance officer
was aware of the previous citations and included copies thereof in the appli-
cation for the inspection warrant. 150 This fact, when coupled with the na-
ture of the publicized injury, further strengthens the argument for sufficient
probable cause. t 5 ' An alternative view, as expressed in the dissenting opin-
ion, is that the officer in his "pell-mell rush to the courthouse" violated the
agency created requirement that complaints be evaluated prior to
inspection. 152
A third important factor indicating the objective reasonableness of the
Federal search is that the compliance officer did not act alone but with the
approval of a United States magistrate.1 53 The magistrate, acting as a neu-
tral third party, issued a warrant after determining that a search was sup-
146. Federal, 695 F.2d at 1021.
147. The Eleventh Circuit in Donovan v. Sarasota Concrete Co., 693 F.2d 1061 (1 th Cir.
1982), chose not to follow the Federal extention of the good faith exception. Neither the Seventh
nor Eleventh Circuit Court noted the distinction that the invalid OSHA inspection in Sarasola
uncovered twelve "non-serious" violations and did not result in monetary penalties, while the
safety violations discovered in Federal were serious and resulted in penalties of $35,400. This
distinction suggests that the magnitude of the violation may be another factor tacitly considered
by the courts when deciding whether the good faith exception applies.
148. In National Realty and Construction Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
the D.C. Circuit stated that "actual occurrence of hazardous conduct is not, by itself, sufficient
evidence of a violation, even if the conduct has led to injury." Id. at 1267.
149. 655 F.2d at 797.
150. Id
151. Based on the Barlow's standards of sufficient administrative probable cause, one may
argue that a newspaper clipping is also not specific evidence of an OSHA violation. This argu-
ment, however, is countered by the fact that the second Barlows standard provides that prob-
able cause may derive from reasonable administrative standards. See infra note 17 and
accompanying text. This standard was arguably satisfied pursuant to the Department of Labor
Occupational Safety and Health Field Operations Manual, Ch. VIII (1983), which provides for
investigation of accidents involving "significant publicity." For a summary of the Field Opera-
tions Manual, see [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] EMPL. SAFETY HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) 12,808.
152. 695 F.2d at 1031 (Pell, J., dissenting).
153. 695 F.2d at 1021.
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ported by probable cause and was not unreasonable.154
Justice Powell, in Brown v. Illinois,' 55 advocated a "sliding scale" ap-
proach to determine whether illegally seized evidence should be excluded. 1
56
On one end of the scale lie flagrantly abusive fourth amendment violations
which require the exclusion sanction for deterrent purposes.157 On the other
end lie "technical" violations which describe police conduct in which abuse
or negligence is absent.1 5 d An example of a technical violation is where an
officer relies in good faith on a warrant which is subsequently invalidated. 1
59
The Federal search was held invalid, subsequent to the search, because the
warrant was issued without probable cause. Therefore, under the Brown
analysis, the violation in Federal was technical and the least serious type of
violation under Justice Powell's analysis.
In sum, the elements of probable cause in the mind of the compliance
officer, objective reasonableness, and a warrant issued by a neutral magis-
trate were all present in the Federal inspection. From a perspective which
holds the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule to be constitutional,
the Seventh Circuit was correct in determining that the exception could ap-
ply to the Federal facts.
The majority's presumption, that a good faith exception exists, is, how-
ever, suspect from a precedential perspective. The Federal majority correctly
stated that the case was one of first impression.' 60 Prior to Federal, the good
faith exception had been recognized by a non-administrative court, in the
civil context, only by way of dicta.'
6 '
The dissent correctly pointed out 1 6 2 that applying the good faith excep-
tion to the present set of facts was inconsistent with the OSHRC decision in
Secretaly of Labor v. Sarasota Concrete Co. ,t63 affirmed on appeal one week after
the Federal decision. 164 In Sarasota the OSHRC held that a complaint alleg-
ing specific violations does not justify an inspection of the entire work area
and the compliance officer's good faith in making a wall-to-wall search does
not preclude suppression.' 65 Affirming the OSHRC decision, the Eleventh
Circuit concluded that evidence seized as a result of the wall-to-wall search
was subject to suppression and that the good faith exception as promulgated
in Wzllams did not apply.' 66 The Sarasota court chose to reject the Williams
154. Regarding the element of a neutral magistrate issuing a warrant, as the issuance relates
to probable cause, the Supreme Court in United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106 (1965),
stated: "in a doubtful or marginal case a search under a warrant may be sustainable where
without one it would fail." (citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270 (1960)).
155. 422 U.S. 590, 606 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring).
156. Id at 610-12.
157. Id at 610-11.
158. I at 611-12.
159. Id at 611.
160. 695 F.2d at 1021.
161. See Robberson, 645 F.2d 22.
162. 695 F.2d at 1028 (Pell, J., dissenting).
163. 9 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1608.
164. Donovan v. Sarasota Concrete Co., 693 F.2d 1061 (11th Cir. 1982).
165. 9 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1608.
166. Donovan v. Sarasota Concrete, 693 F.2d at 1072.
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good faith exception, 167 partly because the good faith holding in Williams
did not apply to situations where a search warrant had been obtained.
1 68
Williams was also distinguished as a criminal proceeding based on evidence
obtained pursuant to a search made incident to an arrest. In contrast, the
citations issued in Sarasota, as in Federal, were civil, or at best "quasi-crimi-
nal", and the evidence was obtained pursuant to a warrant which the com-
pliance officer initially believed was valid. Thus, the Sarasota court
concluded that it was not bound to adhere to the analysis set forth in
Willhams. 169
Because the OSHRC has authority to make constitutional determina-
tions on the act from which it was granted authority,17 0 the Federal court
might have given the OSHRC decision greater deference; however, it was
not bound to follow OSHRC's decision.
17 1
Ultimately, it must be concluded that the Federal decision was based on
inadequate precedent. However, the decision may be justified on the larger
grounds of promoting greater judicial flexibility so that OSHA may better
fulfill its statutory purpose of advancing health and safety in the workplace
without infringing unduly on the privacy expectations of employers. If it
were not for judicial innovation and flexibility the common law would stag-
nate hopelessly, unable to correct past mistakes and respond to new
problems. By introducing the good faith exception to administrative pro-
ceedings, the Seventh Circuit has implemented the legal philosophy es-
poused by the then Judge Cardozo when he wrote:
We must learn that all methods are to be viewed not as idols but as
tools. We must test one of them by the others, supplementing and
reinforcing where there is weakness, so that what is strong and best
in each will be at our service in the hour of need.
1 7 2
In short, although the Federal decision was not justified by precedent, it may
be justified on the basis of responding to a need for greater flexibility in the
application of the exclusionary rule in the administrative search context. 1
73
167. Id The official Sarasota opinion stated, at 693 F.2d 1072, that twelve members of the
Williams court advocated a good faith exception. This is incorrect, thirteen members joined in
the good faith holding in Williams, 622 F.2d at 840.
168. WIlams, 622 F.2d at 840 n.l.
169. 693 F.2d at 1072.
170. See id. at 1067.
171. 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (1982) (OSHRC determinations subject to review by federal courts
of appeal).
172. B. CARDOZO, GROWTH OF THE LAW 103 (1924).
173. Although the privacy interests of individual defendants in the criminal context are
generally greater than those of the employer in the OSHA context, the "anti-exclusionary rule"
branch of the current court has nevertheless limited its attacks on the exclusionary rule to the
criminal context. See supra note 7; Oliver v. United States, 52 U.S.L.W. 4425 (U.S. Apr. 17,
1984) (Permitting warrantless searches of "open fields" leading to siezure of marijuana plants);
Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 217, 2336 (1983) (White, J., concurring); See also Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465, 496 (1976) (Burger, J., dissenting); Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Burger, Who will Watch the Watch-
man?, 14 AM. U.L. REv. 1 (1964) (suggesting abolishment of the exclusionary rule or a limita-
tion on its scope).
If it is accepted that one has a greater expectation of privacy in the home and person than
in the workplace, see Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598 (1981), then it follows that creation of a
good faith exception ought to be tested first in the OSHA context. The Supreme Court, how-
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The court in United States v. Janis 174 recognized that the determination
of whether the exclusionary rule should apply in a criminal proceeding de-
pends upon whether the deterrent effect of the remedy outweighs the cost to
society of suppressing relevant evidence.' 75 The Federal majority did not ex-
plicitly engage in this balancing test; however, the holding implicitly indi-
cates the belief that any possible deterrent effect would not outweigh the cost
to society of excluding reliable and probative evidence of serious OSHA vio-
lations. Similar past violations, severed hands, and $35,400 worth of current
violations undoubtedly tipped the scale in favor of the societal interests in
effective enforcement of OSHA safety standards.
Although the social implications are likely to be minimal, OSHA of-
ficers in the Seventh Circuit will probably enjoy greater success in having
evidence that conforms to the good faith requirements admitted. In turn,
this may put more pressure on employers to provide safer working conditions
for their employees and, at least in theory, the employees should enjoy safer
working conditions.
B. Crzt'ict'sm and Response
Despite the Federal decision, the good faith exception is still the subject
of much criticism. Critics maintain that the good faith exception effectively
bypasses the only remedy available to a defendant aggrieved by a fourth
amendment violation. 17 6 As the Eleventh Circuit recognized: "if Fourth
Amendment rights are to be recognized in an OSHA context, it seems rea-
sonable that the only enforcement mechanism developed to date should like-
wise be recognized."'
77
Justice Brennan argued in his dissent to United States v. Pelter 178 that the
adoption of a good faith exception will destroy the deterrent purpose of the
exclusionary rule. 179 Justice Brennan maintained that the purpose of the
exclusionary rule is to deter "by removing the incentives to disregard it."'
8 0
Critics of the exception also argue that the courts are provoking a relaxation
ever, seems destined to create the exception in the criminal context where privacy expectations
are arguably greater. Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 387 Mass. 488, 441 N.E.2d 725 (1982), cert.
granted sub norn. Massachusettes v. Sheppard, 103 S. Ct. 3534 (1983) (arguments heard January
17, 1984), may prove to be the case in which the good faith exception is recognized by the
Supreme Court in the criminal context.
174. 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
175. Id. at 448-49. Chief Justice Warren described this same conflict in Spano v. New York,
360 U.S. 315, 315 (1959): "we are forced to resolve a conflict between two fundamental interests
of society; its interest in prompt and efficient law enforcement, and in its interest in preventing
the rights of the individual members from being abridged by unconstitutional methods of law
enforcement."
176. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 52 U.S.L.W. 5155, 5163-71 (U.S. July 5, 1984) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 544-62 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 387 Mass. 488, 441 N.E.2d 725, 731-36 (1982), rev'd sub nor.
Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 52 U.S.L.W. 5177 (U.S. July 5, 1984); S. REP. No. 350, 98th Cong.
30-40 (1984) (minority view of Senator Mathias on the proposed Exclusionary Rule Limitation
Act of 1983).
177. Saraota, 693 F.2d at 1071.
178. 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
179. Id at 544 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 557 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)).
19841
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
of police awareness of fourth amendment rights.' 8 ' And the legitimate gov-
ernmental interest in enforcing the Act would not be forfeited by tenaciously
requiring OSHA agents to maintain a high level of constitutional awareness
in their limited area of fourth amendment concerns.1
8 2
At least one commentator has criticized the establishment of a broad
good faith exception to technical violations of the kind involved in Federal
because it may encourage magistrate shopping in order to find the magis-
trate most likely to issue a warrant on weak probable cause; and also that
"good-faith" is based largely on the officer's subjective state of mind "which
is determined from his self-serving and generally uncontradicted
testimony." '
3
Proponents of the exception have also advanced alternatives to the sup-
pression remedy, which, if implemented, could more effectively attain the
goal of deterrence. The alternative remedies include: taking civil action
against the offending officer personally or against the government; taking
criminal action against the offending officer; establishing departmental disci-
plinary proceedings and external review boards; and granting injunctive re-
lief.184 None of these alternatives, however, has yet been institutionalized to
any substantial degree. Nor does it seem likely that they will become readily
available in the foreseeable future.
The adoption of a good faith exception, however, does not spell doom
for employers' fourth amendment rights primarily because the reasonable-
ness and good faith requirements provide built in definitional protections
which necessarily guard against flagrant constitutional violations.
In short, the good faith exception, when applied in the OSHA context,
on a case by case basis, and combined with reliable alternative remedies to
exclusion, may create the desirable effect of allowing into evidence reliable
and probative evidence of OSHA safety violations. While making the evi-
dence admissible, the exception will simultaneously deter flagrant abuses of
the inspection power, and preserve the privacy interests of employers. The
administrative arena seems best suited to test a good faith exception because
the privacy expectation is arguably less substantial than that at stake in
criminal searches. The Supreme Court, however, disagrees.' 85
IV. CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit's -holding in Federal established for the first time the
good faith exception to the exclusion of evidence obtained by an OSHA
compliance officer in violation of the fourth amendment. In order for the
181. See Ball, supra note 16, at 656.
182. See Trant, supra note 41, at 716.
183. Id at 708-09.
184. See id. at 710-15 (criticisms of alternatives also presented). See also Geller, Enforcing the
Fourth Amendment.- The Exclusionary Rule and its Alternatives, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 621; Posner, Re-
thinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 SuP. CT. REV. 89; Roche, A Viable Substitutefor the Exclusionag
Rule. A Civil Rights Appeals Board, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 223 (1973); Wilkey, Constitutional
Alternatives to the Exclusionay Rule, Exclusionary Rule Symposium, 23 S. TEX. L.J. 531 (1982); Com-
ment, The Federal Injunction as a Remedy for Unconstitutional Polce Conduct, 78 YALE L.J. 143 (1968).
185. See supra note 7.
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exception to apply, the'officer must conduct the inspection in good faith and
in the reasonable belief that his actions are authorized.' 8 6 The Federal hold-
ing, however, conflicts with a factually similar Eleventh Circuit case where
the court chose not to adopt the good faith exception given the record before
it, and instead suppressed the illegally obtained evidence.' 8 7 Although the
Federal case is representative of the current judicial trend of narrowing the
exclusionary rule's applicability, 188 the decision's impact will remain uncer-
tain outside the Seventh Circuit until the Supreme Court first decides
whether the exclusionary rule applies as a remedy in cases where OSHA
commits fourth amendment infractions.189 Given the recent emasculation of
the exclusionary rule, 190 it would be logical for the Court to create a general
bar to the-exclusion of evidence in OSHA proceedings; however, it seems
unlikely that the Court will be as willing to admit probative evidence against
employers as it is against criminal defendants and illegal aliens.
Terence M. Ridley
186. Federal, 695 F.2d at 1023.
187. Sarasota, 693 F.2d 1061.
188. See supra note 7.
189. See supra note 32.
190. See supra note 7.
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